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Introduction
This paper focuses on some issues of the recent developments in disaster management and 
policy in Japan.　Throughout ancient and modern times, Japan has been sporadicaly hit by 
natural calamities due to its geographical and geological location.　Moreover, when the country 
began to modernize, particularly after World War II, people flocked to industrialized areas and 
setled in congested urban districts, which made them even more vulnerable to disasters.　Thus, 
Japan has long struggled to minimize disaster risk; the government, nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs), researchers and related organizations, and individuals have amassed substantial 
knowledge and technology in this field.　Japan’s experience wil have valuable impact on other 
countries, particularly developing countries that also have a high incidence of natural disasters.
This paper also stresses that past Japanese policy against disasters has not been necessarily 
good or satisfactory.　However, after the devastation wrought by the Kobe Earthquake1) of 
1995, Japan resolved to improve its disaster management and significant evolutionary progress 
was observed.　Under this background, the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake struck of the coun-
try’s northeast coast on March 11, 2011.　The tri-fold disaster of the great earthquake, the trig-
gered tsunami and the nuclear plant accident has left some heavy lessons not only to Japan but 
also to the rest of the world.
1.　Characteristics of Japan’s Disaster Management and Policy
　1.1　Historical overview
Judging by its geographical, geological, and meteoric profile, Japan is a crucible of 
calamities: earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, typhoons, heavy rains, floods, and 
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1) Actualy, it is caled Great Hanshin-Awaji (or South of Hyogo Prefecture) Earthquake, but for the sake 
of simplicity, I wil just cal it the Kobe Earthquake.
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landslides.　The disaster generating rate of Japan is very high, considering that its territory 
makes up only 0.25% of the Earth’s land mass.　Actualy, a staggering 15% of the planet’s 
total disaster damage is borne by the country for the period 1970–2004.2)
Meanwhile, social vulnerability has increased progressively since Japan became an eco-
nomicaly developed nation.　Population, assets, and urban activity have burgeoned in coastal 
areas, including some major bays.　Big cities are crowded by rising populations and buildings 
that extend both upward and underground.　Furthermore, as the aged population grows, so does 
the need for special support for the elderly during disasters.　Away from urban centers, espe-
cialy in the mountainous regions, the slowdown in population growth is more noticeable.　
Thus, the residents’ disaster prevention capacity is rapidly eroding.
Since disaster risk emanates from natural calamities and social vulnerability, Japan’s dam-
age and casualty statistics ought to be one of the highest in the world.　It is not.　According to 
the historical data, the casualties and economic losses are comparatively low despite the fre-
36
2) The economic damage value for the period 1970–2004 was calculated from the International Disaster 
Database of the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters. The data source is 
htp:/www.cred.be/.
Source: The author edited statistics in the Cabinet of Japan (2008).
Figure 1　Number of Casualties and Ratio of Stock Losses to GNP, 1957–2007
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quency of natural disasters.　Figure 1 shows the number of casualties (persons) on the left verti-
cal axis and on the right axis, the ratio of lost public infrastructure stock to the gross national 
product (GNP) from 1957 to 2007.　The spike that appears in 1995, the year of the Kobe Earth-
quake, is to be expected, considering the destructive power of the quake.　If we exclude 1995, 
however, both human and physical losses have been decreasing in the last 50 years.3)　This 
reflects Japan’s eforts at implementing counter disaster measures.　The stock values of the 
numerator of the ratio shown on the right axis do not include the loss of buildings, particularly 
dwelings.　Note that the efects of the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake of 2011 have not been 
reflected in Figure 1.
　1.2　Characteristics of disaster countermeasures
The seting up of legislative action for assisting disaster victims can be traced to the old 
law as far back as the 1880s.4)　A rescue fund was created in each prefecture in 1899, backed 
by subsidy from the central government.　The worst disaster before World War II was the 
Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923, in which about 100,000 persons died, mostly in post-quake 
fires.　The central government released a huge amount for the reconstruction of ruined 
Tokyo—almost as big as the national budget—and simultaneously undertook large-scale city 
planning.
When World War II ended, a series of great calamities hit Japan.　The direction taken in 
establishing a rescue organization and funds was heavily influenced by the resolve to avoid the 
confusion resulting from each of the major disasters.　The Nankai earthquake in 1946 afected 
a wide area in western Japan, and each prefecture fielded a diferent strategy to aid the catastro-
phe’s victims.　Thus, the Disaster Relief Act (1947) was enacted to standardize the disaster 
relief actions of municipalities (mainly prefectures) and clearly delineate the roles of the munici-
palities and the central government; the functions of related ministries and agencies were speci-
fied by low-rank statutes.　Since then, this law has been the basis of public aid in the 
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3) It is conventionaly believed that disaster risk decreases with economic development. Horwich (2000), 
for example, asserts that people can beter prepare for disasters as their wealth increases (through sav-
ings and insurance), so that the society as a whole becomes safer. The case of Japan seems to validate 
this view at first glance, but as the next section explains, the downward trend in disaster losses has 
been atained mainly by government investment policy on public infrastructure rather than by private 
market mechanisms such as insurance provisions.
4) The law stipulates that the government should make provisions for food and other necessities when 
rescuing people who have been afected by a disaster.
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“response” stage of the disaster management cycle.
The Ise Bay typhoon in 1959, which claimed 5,098 lives, prompted the enactment of the 
Disaster Management Basic Law (1961) to systematize disaster prevention and response.　The 
new law incorporated provisions of the Disaster Relief Law.　The scope of authority and duties 
of the related agencies, and some financial and monetary measures were specified.　A year 
later, the Law Concerning Special Fiscal Aid for Coping with Devastating Disasters (1962) 
authorized the national government to increase its subsidy to municipalities when a “devastat-
ing” disaster occurred.　As a market-oriented measure, the earthquake insurance system was 
introduced in 1966, after the Nigata earthquake of 1964.　This is a reinsurance scheme, in 
which private insurers share the risk among themselves in paying claims to subscribers but the 
government pays a much larger proportion of claims if a single earthquake causes aggregate 
damage of over almost 1 trilion yen.
The country fine-tuned its disaster response system step by step, as it reacted to a succes-
sion of devastating calamities.　The features of the system are: (i) the definition of the roles of 
the central government and municipalities, so that the responsibility is not concentrated on the 
national government alone; (i) the definition of the jurisdiction of the relevant ministries and 
agencies; and (ii) a focus on the restoration of public utilities and facilities (consisting of engi-
neering and construction work) when assisting people and afected areas.
Fiscal expenditures on al disaster-related sectors have been historicaly large.　Their ratio 
to the general fiscal balance was about 8% in 1965 and has hovered at around 5% in recent 
years, although the trend has been downward.　Figure 2 shows the changing paterns in the 
relative share of expenditure for the diferent disaster countermeasures in the last four decades.　
The damage reduction and preparedness measures in the pre-disaster period, and the response 
and reconstruction measures in the post-disaster period comprise the disaster management cycle.　
The revival and reconstruction expenditure reflects the share of alocated money in the post-dis-
aster period.　The other three items show the relative shares in the pre-disaster period.　
Although the share of post-disaster expenditures fluctuates considerably, due to the yearly difer-
ences in the real disaster occurrence, it has a decreasing tendency overal.　In contrast, the 
share of expenditures on disaster reduction measures shows a significant and steady climb, hav-
ing reached 20%–30% in recent years and already approximating post-disaster expenditures.　
Expenditures on disaster research (science and technology) have also been rising, but they 
remain smaler than the other items.　Japan’s expenditures on land conservation under disaster 
management are both sizable and flexible.　The largest of the disaster-related budgets, at 
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50%–60% of the total, land conservation funds can be realocated for reconstruction after big 
disasters.5)
The abovementioned features tel us partly why disaster damage in Japan has been shrink-
ing in spite of the increasing frequency of disasters.　There are two primary reasons behind this 
phenomenon.　First, Japan has a long history of calamities, from which it has learned to alo-
cate tax money for land conservation, such as land and river improvement, and the prevention 
of coast and river erosion, subsidence, landslides, etc.6)　Second, great efforts have been 
exerted to direct public policy towards disaster prevention and reduction, including advances in 
weather survey and forecasting technology and improvements in the dissemination of informa-
tion on disasters.
2.　Evolutionary Development after the Kobe (Hanshin-Awaji) Earthquake
The Kobe Earthquake was tremendously ruinous in terms of causalities and lost physical 
stock of public infrastructure.　It devastated Kobe and the cities surounding it, one of the most 
39
5) Less was spent on land conservation and more in reconstruction in 1971 (typhoons and floods), 1995 
(Kobe Earthquake), and 2004 (Nigata-Chuetsu Earthquake).
6) A huge chunk of the budget is alocated to general construction every year, and some politicians and 
construction firms are known to have colaborated underground for their self-interest. This is a typical 
case of bad governance in public investment.
Source: The author edited the figures in Cabinet, GOJ (2009).
Figure 2　Relative Shares of the National Budget in Disaster Countermeasures
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densely populated and highly industrialized areas of Japan.　The magnitude of the convulsion 
was 7.3, and the epicenter was right beneath the urban area.　The temblor kiled 6,400 people, 
injured 44,000, and destroyed 460,000 homes (totaly or partialy).　Some 317,000 people had 
to be evacuated to schools and public buildings.　As can be observed in Figure 2, there was a 
sudden jump in reconstruction expenditure after January 17, 1995 — the date of the earthquake.
　2.1　Improvement of the disaster response organization
The initial responses of both the national and local governments to the Kobe Earthquake 
were delayed.　To compound the woefuly slow response of the prefectural ofices, almost al 
trafic and telecommunication systems, including satelite telecommunications, were destroyed.　
It took almost three days for the central government to grasp the extent of the damage.　The 
afected cities and municipalities had a formidable task ahead of them, and they had to work 
hand-in-hand with or under the supervision of the upper hierarchical organizations, such as the 
Hyogo Prefecture and the central government.　The confusion that ensued bared several weak 
points in Japan’s disaster management organization.7)　To restore order, some degree of govern-
mental reorganization had to be carried out.　To address the delay in initial response, the cen-
tral government established a cabinet information center.　Also, the Disaster Management 
Bureau was elevated to Cabinet level and a Minister of State for Disaster Management was 
appointed.　Furthermore, under the revised law, the prime minister can immediately set up the 
Disaster Countermeasures Field Headquarter.　 Although the organizational structure of the 
governmental response was improved, the response of the current government has not been 
working wel at the face of this year’s Great Eastern Japan Earthquake mainly because of it’s 
political weakness.
One important issue is the role of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) at emergency 
response periods of disasters.　Under the existing protocols, the governor of a local prefecture 
has to request emergency support of JSDF and wil only receive it if a state of emergency can 
be proved.　At the time of the Kobe Earthquake, the Governor’s request and efective commu-
nication with the central government was so delayed that JSDF were not sent in large numbers 
for four days, leading to many unnecessary deaths.　Reflecting this failure, quick and efective 
appearances of JSDF have been observed in recent disasters.　About half of the troops were 
sent to Tohoku area at the time of the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake in 2011, and they 
40
7) There are several critical assessments on this issue. See, e. g., Kazama (1998).
─　　─
Japan’s Disaster Management
received high appreciation and recognition for their efective and intensive work not only by the 
victims but also by the nation.
　2.2　Balancing the reconstruction of physical stocks and human lives
The data analysis of Figure 1 cannot be applied to the Kobe Earthquake because most of 
the damaged stock was buildings, including dwelings.　(The lost values of buildings were 
excluded from the infrastructure loss measured on the right axis in Figure 1.) The oficial esti-
mated damage was placed at about ¥10 trilion or about US$85 bilion, 60% of which was dam-
age to buildings.
Visible public infrastructure or facilities were reconstructed at a very brisk pace after the 
Kobe Earthquake, thanks to the aforementioned budgetary system that had been put in place by 
the Law for Coping with Devastating Disasters, and to the temporary special arrangements that 
were made.
The reconstruction expenditure for the Kobe Earthquake began fiscal year 1994 (using the 
fiscal alowance) and continued al the way to the secondary compensation budget in fiscal year 
2000, when the main part of the work ended.　The total reconstruction budget of the central 
government reached ¥5.02 trilion; about 2/3 was spent on infrastructure revival and housing-
related expenditure was about ¥1.1 trilion.　Housing-related expenses included rubble proc-
essing, emergency temporary housing, and public rental housing construction.　These could be 
classified as public facility expenditures, except for the subsidies for interest payments on hous-
ing loans and for the housing rentals of the people who had lost their homes.　The soft side of 
economic revival—condolence money, welfare and educational support, and measures for smal 
business—received a mere 12% of the total reconstruction budget, a clear indication the coun-
try’s stand on emergency restoration and reconstruction in the hard side.　However, in the 
budgets of the prefecture and cities, the item of expenditure relevant to life reconstruction does 
post a litle increase.　For example, a big part of the disaster budget of Hyogo Prefecture for 
two years had been alocated for hard reconstruction; only about 20% went to “soft” support for 
life relief, etc.　Although the measures for revival continued until after fiscal year 2001, the 
budget earmarked for the purpose decreased substantialy, and its composition was gradualy 
41
8) This activity has been conducted mainly through the Disaster Reduction and Human Renovation Insti-
tution, which was established by the Hyogo Prefecture and the national government. The institute’ 
main activities are research, exhibitions, conferences, education, training of local government experts, 
and library services.
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altered to accommodate disaster reduction and commemoration enterprises.8)
There were few records of oficial support for the revival or reconstruction of individual 
lives.　During the recovery stage, a disaster victim first needs a residence then an occupation.　
About 460,000 households sufered housing damage judged as more than 50% damage.　The 
number of jobless people also grew rapidly.
Although early financing was required for life revival, public cash support was not imple-
mented in principle, except for the conditional distribution of donations and the smal sum given 
to victims with severely damaged homes.　The principle of “not carrying out individual com-
pensation,” which is peculiar to Japan, hinders personal property formation (e.g., a residence).　
The government has stubbornly clung to the practice for years.9)　In the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency group training program for disaster management specialists of developing 
countries (where I work as a lecturer), this “principle” surprises the participants the most, and 
they are thus troubled by Japan’s disaster management system.
Five years after the Kobe Earthquake, the Western Totori Prefecture Earthquake struck.　
The governor of the prefecture, despite heavy contrary pressure from the central government, 
made the reconstruction of life, mostly for the elderly in the countryside, his top policy.　Cash 
benefits had to be put at the victims’ disposal for repairing their homes or constructing new 
ones.　The governor decided to issue public (prefectural) bonds for the purpose.
Eventualy, the national government changed its position on the issue.　The strong clamor 
of citizens (specificaly, those afected by the Kobe Earthquake) and the obvious plight of disas-
ter victims who had lost dwelings in the calamities that folowed finaly persuaded politicians 
(members of the Diet) to unanimously amend Natural Disaster Victims Relief Law in 2007.　
The amended law alowed cash support of up to ¥3 milion for reconstructing severely colapsed 
residences.　However, the much-awaited amendment was not applied to the victims of the 
Kobe Earthquake, as most of the housing reconstruction in the area had been accomplished 
through self-help.
The above-mentioned amended law began to be applied to any kinds of large-scale disas-
ters which occured in 1999 and thence.　Although there remain some limitations of applicabil-
ity of the law, this amendment was a symbolic change in Japan’s disaster management thought 
and practice toward a more heavy weight of reconstruction of victims’ livelihood.　Confronted 
42
9) Probably, central government bureaucrats insist on retaining this “principle” because they fear that, 
should cash benefits be awarded to victims of major calamities, the government’s cofers would be 
emptied by the next big earthquake to hit the likes of metro Tokyo.
─　　─
Japan’s Disaster Management
with the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake, there were many discussions how to ease the limita-
tions of applicability of the law in addition to the ones how to finance post-disaster reconstruc-
tion in general.
　2.3　Improvement of the disaster information system
At the time of the Kobe Earthquake, it was dificult to transmit information promptly 
because some telecommunication systems were destroyed and elsewhere, congestion and inter-
ruptions on communication networks occurred.　More importantly, it was just before internet 
and mobile-phones rapidly spread when the disaster occured.
Fortunately, the recent strides in telecommunication infrastructure have been remarkable.　
The Japan Meteorological Agency and local governments have developed some 3,000 seismic 
intensity observation points nationwide.　Based on the information generated by the observa-
tion points, the government developed the Early Estimation System and Emergency Measure 
Support System.　The Agency introduced the urgent earthquake alarm system in 2007, which 
immediately broadcasts through television and radio the occurrence of an earthquake that has a 
seismic intensity of three or higher.10)
　2.4　Important role of volunteers
In 1995, volunteers from diferent parts of the country went to Kobe to help with earth-
quake relief operations (sometimes caled the “volunteer first year” of Japan).　The volunteers, 
who worked there for 13 months after the occurence of the disaster, numbered about 1,400,000 
(Hyogo Prefecture announcement).　Around 60% were students.　Moreover, based on the 
questionnaire circulated by the Hyogo Prefecture, 70% of the volunteers were doing it for the 
first time.
Among local volunteer organizations, networks (e.g., an independent liaison council) were 
created for information exchange and mutual administration.　Some organizations that emerged 
in the afected area specialized in disaster relief and reconstruction, and continue to ofer active 
support service to victims of serious disasters in Japan and abroad.
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10) Smal tremors caled P waves and big tremors caled S waves occur at the same time, but their speeds 
are diferent. Based on the observation of P waves at some point and using propagation velocity difer-
ence between S and P waves, they predict a seismic intensity there. The earthquake early warning was 
put into announcement 17 times since its start in October 2007 until the Great Eastern Japan Earth-
quake and performed fairly wel. But, after the Easter Japan, the system has a tendency to respond too 
sensitively and over-predict. The system should be improved further.
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　2.5　Community-based disaster management
Many local municipalities have enacted or amended local area disaster prevention planning.　
The initiatives are progressing in the direction of the concept that an “area,” which plays a vital 
role in revival and disaster reduction, denotes a community, not necessarily a municipality.
With respect to reconstruction in the urban districts afected by the Kobe Earthquake, there 
were sometimes wide gaps between the local government’s proposals and the plans readied by 
district residents.　Each district used many diferent approaches.　In several districts, commu-
nity development councils (about 100 councils) were created; initial opposition shifted to col-
laboration after numerous discussions.　In some cases, a prominent member of the community 
would assume leadership and approve the government’s proposals without much objection.　In 
fact, community members should indeed play a leading role in their communitiesco.　A com-
mon expression is machizukuri (community development through colaboration), which means 
that the resident and the authority work together (Shiozaki et al. [25], p. 101).
Recent earthquakes in Chuetsu (2004), and Iwate and Miyagi Inland (2008) occurred in 
areas surounded by mountains.　The residents of the afected areas had community conscious-
ness, so that community-based reconstruction projects are easier to implement here than in 
Kobe.11)
Recently, community-based disaster reduction and reconstruction have entered the main-
stream of disaster management in Japan and elsewhere in the world.　The UNCRD (2004) and 
World Bank (2006) are good examples of mainstreaming and practicing community-based disas-
ter management.　Okada and Hiraoka (2008) also explain the importance of community-based 
disaster reduction management, with special emphasis on the training of professionals.
Finaly, I would like to mention Japan’s traditional fire brigade, the fire-fighting organiza-
tion of a community (be it a city, town, or vilage).　Fire brigade members usualy hold a regu-
lar jobs elsewhere, becoming civil servants (part-time volunteer service) only when disasters 
occur.　They assist the professional fire-fighting force in protecting and rescuing residents from 
fires, earthquakes, floods, etc.　In everyday life, brigade members also instruct households on 
fire prevention and conduct fire drils.　In the countryside, where there are sometimes no fire 
stations and professional fire fighters, the fire brigade is the sole emergency organization in the 
44
11) The 2008 Sichuan Earthquake in China was very powerful and sphericaly extensive, afecting both 
urban and rural communities. Reconstruction plans varied from area to area. Some communities (or 
towns) situated between mountains had to uproot and move to very far but flat sites because of the 
severe damage caused by the earthquake and the threat of landslides.
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community.　Almost al municipalities nationwide have fire brigades.　This traditional system 
should have been an important factor to keep the country resilient to calamities.
3.　International Cooperation for Disaster Management and Prevention
After the earthquake, Hyogo Prefecture and Kobe City became the base of international dis-
aster prevention activities.　The highlight was the United Nations World Conference on Disas-
ter Reduction, which was held in Kobe in 2005.　The “Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–
2015,”12) which was cobbled together in the conference, has provided the fundamental indicator 
of disaster prevention activities in the international society for 10 years.　The conference pro-
duced the framework of international disaster prevention cooperation; the participants agreed 
that damage reduction must be the world’s common disaster management target when drafting 
sustainable development policy (Cabinet of Japan [2000]).　To properly apply the framework, 
the assistance of the UN disaster prevention strategy (UN/ISDR) wil be needed, as wel as the 
cooperation and adjustment of the organizations concerned in each field.　To implement the 
agenda of the Hyogo Framework (i. e., the inclusion disaster prevention concepts in the revival 
process), the international reconstruction assistance platform was instaled, in cooperation with 
related international organizations.　These activities are being undertaken at the new urban core 
in eastern Kobe.
Much improvement in accepting various assists from overseas to Japan has been observed 
just after the Great Easter Japan Earthquake.　24 countries sent the emergency support teams 
including 13 countries with rescue dogs.　At the time of the Kobe, the Japanese government 
lost several days to determine the acceptance of foreign rescue teams and eventualy only Swit-
zerland and France came to search dead bodies with rescue dogs.　In this connection, I think 
that Japan should promote a new and innovative framework of international cooperation of dis-
aster management including emergency support with foreign countries, particularly with China 
and Korea, the Japan’s important neighboring countries; 48 hours are crucialy important to 
save victims’ life.
I think that Japan’s thrust on disaster prevention and emergency restoration support extend 
beyond its linkup with related international organizations; the country must acknowledge disas-
ter prevention and management as an important field in international cooperation.　In develop-
45
12) See ISDR (2005) for more detail.
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ing countries, such as those in Asia, there is a vicious circle in disaster management: public 
funds are scarce, particularly for preventing and mitigating disasters; in turn, the impact of a dis-
aster tends to be heavier, thus worsening poverty.　To help developing countries break the 
negative cycle, they must be trained in various fields of disaster management and encouraged to 
be self-reliant (Cabinet of Japan [2008], p. 238).　Admitedly, though, there is a hard side to 
the issue, such as proper and adequate infrastructure for disaster prevention.　In disaster-prone 
Japan, there are many places wherein foreign specialists can inspect actual stricken areas and 
visit related facilities, government ofices, and universities.
No country has thorough countermeasures against calamities, not even Japan.　Normaly, 
a revival fund has restrictions.　During international cooperation initiatives involving technol-
ogy transfer on disaster prevention and management, Japan’s best practices and “bad examples” 
should both be taught.
Conclusions
This report first reviewed the step-by-step improvement in Japan’s disaster policy.　It was 
the powerful Kobe Earthquake that ushered in a new era in disaster response.　The quake 
became the benchmark in disaster prevention and management, particularly as regards the coor-
dination between the government, community, and citizenry during the recovery phase.　The 
great damage wrought by the temblor should be a constant reminder to try to reduce such huge 
losses in money, assets, and human lives.　Developing countries that are disaster-prone are 
likely to experience similar devastation; more international cooperation is needed in this field.　
Japan, one of the leaders in the area, is already playing an important role.
Both traditional and modern schemes of Japan’s disaster management - at least some of 
them - can be shared with other countries.　They are summarized as folows:
臼　An example is the fire brigade concept: Volunteers are trained and organized into a 
community-based team that helps protect the locality against any kind of major 
calamity.
渦 Based on the past experience, the Japanese government alocates its considerable 
amounts of annual budget to land conservation.　If a great disaster occurs, some of 
them are realocated for reconstructing damaged public infrastructures.
嘘　Japan’s insurance system works quite wel so far compared with other countries 
although its subscription rate is stil low.
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唄 Early warning systems against tsunamis and earthquakes, already operational in 
Japan, wil hopefuly be used worldwide in near future.
欝 Japan is one of the leading countries which pursue disaster risk reduction along the 
spirit of the Hyogo Framework.　Japan has learnt, particularly after the Kobe quake 
that a country must make its reduction priority and develop or modify policies, laws, 
and organizational arangements to integrate its reduction.　It must also alocate sufi-
cient resources to support and maintain them.　Colaboration and cooperation among 
al stakeholders are crucial both to disaster risk reduction as wel as disaster recovery 
and reconstruction: the government, civil society including volunteers, community-
based organizations, the academic, and the media, and the private sector al have a 
role to play.
蔚 The Great Eastern Japan Earthquake of 2011 has left at least two heavy lessons to 
Japan and also to the rest of the world.　First, “soft” preparedness for tsunamis, 
which include evacuation drils, escape routes and towering shelters, should be most 
important for coastal residents.　Even some 10 meters high seawals, which were 
believed to be “hard” enough, could not protect countless damage of both physical 
and human lives.　Secondly, we have learnt that nuclear power stations, particularly 
aged ones, are not safe against many safety messages advocated by specialists.
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